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ESTIMATING WAGE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES
Marjorie L. Baldwint
INTRODUCTION
To combat the first wave stereotype that persons with
disabilities were unemployable, disability advocates formulated
a second wave message which emphasized that workers with
disabilities could be just as productive as non-disabled workers
given appropriate accommodations. The low wages and low
employment rates of workers with disabilities, therefore, were
caused by employer discrimination, not by the limiting effects of
workers' disabilities.
When economists measured the extent of discrimination
against workers with disabilities, however, they took account of
the limiting effects of disabilities on worker productivity. These
economic models assumed that there was at least some decrease
in worker productivity caused by the disabilities. Many disabili-
ty advocates, in defense of the second wave message, criticized
these models, arguing that economists should not take disabili-
ties into account when measuring discrimination.
A third wave message is needed to reconcile the advocates'
position promoting the employability of persons with disabilities
with the economists' position that the limiting effect of disability
is a relevant factor which must be included in wage equations
that measure discrimination. The third wave message should
emphasize that, while disability can impact productivity and
this effect must be measured in order to obtain meaningful
estimates of discrimination, there is still evidence that employer
discrimination reduces the wages and employment prospects of
persons with disabilities.
This essay applies a standard decomposition technique for
measuring wage discrimination to a sample of disabled and non-
disabled adults. Estimates of discrimination are derived with
and without controls for the limiting effects of disabilities. The
results suggest that, even in the more stringent model that
includes controls for limitations, there is evidence of wage
discrimination against workers with disabilities. Evidence of
' Assistant Professor of Economics, East Carolina University, Greenville,
North Carolina. Ph.D., Syracuse University, 1988.
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discrimination based on models that exclude controls for limita-
tions - the results of which thus may be biased - is easily
rebutted with the argument that, had the variables been includ-
ed in the model, the evidence of discrimination would disappear.
Therefore, the strongest evidence of employer discrimination
against workers with disabilities comes from models that control
for the limiting effects of disability on worker productivity.
I. BACKGROUND
Recent decisions in cases of labor market discrimination
against blacks and women have relied more heavily on econo-
metric methods to determine whether there is evidence of
discrimination.' The econometric technique used to estimate
the extent of wage discrimination against a particular minority
group was first set forth by Professor Ronald Oaxaca (pro-
nounced "Wa-ha-ka")2  Numerous empirical studies of wage
discrimination using variations of Oaxaca's technique have
appeared in scholarly journals and in cases arising under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
' Orley Ashenfelter & Ronald Oaxaca, The Economics of Discrimination:
Economists Enter the Courtroom, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 321 (1987).
2 Ronald Oaxaca, Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets,
14 INT'L ECON. REV. 693 (1973). In studies of labor market discrimination, a
minority group refers to a demographic group that is relatively disadvantaged
in employment, earnings, or occupational distribution. The majority group is
the relevant comparison group. Specific minority groups that have been the
focus of government policies to eliminate discrimination in the labor market
include Blacks, Hispanics, women, and persons with disabilities.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1992). The Oaxaca method has
been applied in sociology. See, e.g., Otis D. Duncan, Inheritance of Poverty or
Inheritance of Race?, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 85-105 (Daniel P.
Moynihan & James L. Sundquist eds., 1968). The Oaxaca model has also been
applied in the field of economics. See, e.g., Oaxaca, supra note 2; Allen S.
Blinder, Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates, 8 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 436 (1973)
Variations of the Oaxaca method have been used to estimate discrimi-
natory wage differentials against blacks. See, e.g., Richard J. Butler, Estimat-
ing Wage Discrimination in the Labor Market, 70 J. HUM. RESOURCES 606
(1982); Jeremiah Cotton, On the Decomposition of Wage Differentials, 70 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 236 (1988); James D. Gwartney & James E. Long, The Relative
Earnings of Blacks and Other Minorities, 31 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 336
(1978); Nicholas M. Kiefer & Sharon P. Smith, Union Impact and Wage
Discrimination By Region, 12 J. HUM. RESOURCES 521 (1977); Stanley H.
Masters, The Effect of Educational Differences and Labor Market Discrimi-
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The basis of the Oaxaca technique is to separate observed
minority-majority wage differentials into two parts: a part that
is explained by differences in the average productivity-related
characteristics of the two groups, and an unexplained part that
is attributed to employer discrimination. One important criti-
cism of the method is that unmeasured differences in productivi-
ty also appear in the unexplained part of the wage differential,
producing estimates of wage discrimination that are too large.
In other words, if important variables measuring differences in
the average productivity of minority and majority workers -
such as differences in the average quality of schooling - are not
included in the wage equation, then wage differences that could
be explained by differences in productivity are instead attribut-
ed to discrimination.
The problem is even more troublesome when the Oaxaca
technique is applied to workers with disabilities. In the case of
disabled workers, the issue of eliminating wage differences that
reflect differences in productivity becomes particularly sensitive
because the very characteristic that identifies a worker as
disabled - a limitation that affects the ability to perform basic
life tasks - also reduces the worker's productivity in some jobs.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),4 which prohib-
its private employers from discriminating on the basis of disabil-
ity, has opened a new arena for litigation of discrimination
claims and is likely to increase the demand for statistical
evidence of discrimination against workers with disabilities.5
nation on the Relative Earnings of Black Men, 9 J. HUM. RESOURCES 342
(1974).
Similarly, variations of the Oaxaca technique have been used to estimate
wage discrimination against Hispanics. See, e.g., Cordelia W. Reimers, Labor
Market Discrimination Against Hispanic and Black Men, 65 REv. EcON. &
STAT. 570 (1983).
The Oaxaca technique has been used to estimate wage discrimination
against women. Farrell E. Bloch & Sharon P. Smith, Human Capital and
Labor Market Employment, 12 J. HUM. RESOURCES 550 (1977); Mary Corcoran
& Greg J. Duncan, Work History, Labor Force Attachment, and Earnings
Differences Between Races and Sexes, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 3 (1979); see, e.g.,
Burton G. Malkiel & Judith A. Malkiel, Male-Female Pay Differentials in
Professional Employment, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 693 (1973); David Neumark,
Employers' Discriminatory Behavior and the Estimation of Wage Discrimina-
tion, 23 J. HUM. RESOURCES 279 (1988).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991).
' It is not necessary that a disabled plaintiff provide statistical evidence of
discrimination against disabled workers to prove the plaintiffs case under
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Several studies have already used the Oaxaca technique to
estimate discriminatory wage differentials between workers
with disabilities and non-disabled workers.'
Non-economists, however, disagree regarding whether it is
appropriate to include controls for the limiting effects of disabili-
ties in a model designed to estimate wage discrimination
against workers with disabilities. Disability advocates and
members of the disabled community have promoted the civil
rights of workers with disabilities by emphasizing their abilities
rather than their limitations - this is the essence of the second
wave message. Some advocates contend that a model that
associates disabilities with productivity losses is contrary to the
premises of the disability movement. On the other hand,
meaningful estimates of wage discrimination cannot include the
effects of real differences in productivity. Economists would not
accept a study of discrimination against workers with disabili-
ties that ignored the limiting effects of disabilities on productivi-
ty.
The following sections describe in greater detail the Oaxaca
technique for measuring wage discrimination, and present an
application to demonstrate how controlling for the limiting
effects of disabilities can change estimates of wage discrimina-
tion against workers with disabilities.
ADA Title I. Under the ADA an employer cannot discriminate against an
individual because of that individual's disability. Thus, "[ilt is not necessary
to make statistical comparisons between a group of people with disabilities
and people who are not disabled to show that a person with a disability is
screened out by a selection standard." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMIN, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS
(TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IV-3 (1992). Neverthe-
less, in some cases a plaintiff may choose to prove his or her case by using
statistical evidence. Further, presumably, statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion against persons with disabilities will be utilized to show the efficacy - or
lack thereof - of ADA Title I.
6 See, e.g., Maijorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, Labor Market
Discrimination Against Men With Disabilities, 29 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1
(1994); MARJORIE L. BALDWIN & WILLIAM G. JOHNSON, LABOR MARKET
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES (East Carolina Universi-
ty Working Paper, 1993); William G. Johnson & James Lambrinos, Wage
Discrimination Against Handicapped Men and Women, 20 J. HUM. RESOURCES
264 (1985).
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II. THE ECONOMETRIC METHOD OF ESTIMATING
WAGE DISCRIMINATION
A. INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRIC REGRESSION
Economists say that wage discrimination occurs when
differences in the average wages of two groups of workers are
unexplained by differences in their average productivity. As
noted above, Oaxaca's technique estimates the size of discrimi-
natory wage differentials by separating observed wage differen-
tials into two parts.
One part of the wage differential is "explained" by differ-
ences in the productivity-related characteristics of majority and
minority workers. For example, majority workers may have
more education, on average, than minority workers. Wage
differences associated with the differences in education are
included in the explained part of the wage differential.
A second part of the wage differential, associated with
differences in returns to the characteristics of minority and
majority workers, is "unexplained" and attributed to discrimina-
tion. For example, majority workers may be paid more, on
average, per year of education than minority workers. Wage
differences associated with this difference in returns to educa-
tion are included in the unexplained part of the wage differen-
tial.
Thus, the Oaxaca technique is said to "decompose" the
minority-majority wage differential into an explained, or nondis-
criminatory, component and an unexplained component that is
attributed to discrimination.'
B. A SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE
To see how the Oaxaca technique might be applied to wage
differentials between disabled and non-disabled workers, consid-
er the following simplified example. Suppose a firm employs
laborers to sort and move crates in its warehouse, where, the
only job requirements are strength and speed. On average, non-
disabled workers are able to move 20 crates per hour, while
workers with disabilities are only able to move 15 crates per
hour. The workers' disabilities have caused functional limita-
tions - less strength and speed - that reduce their productivi-
"See Oaxaca, supra note 2, at 695-97.
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ty. As a result, the average wage for non-disabled workers is
$8.00 per hour and for workers with disabilities $5.50 per hour.
The $2.50 hourly wage differential between disabled and
non-disabled warehouse workers can be decomposed as follows.
Non-disabled workers are paid $.40 per crate moved. Since
workers with disabilities move five fewer crates per hour, we
would expect their wages to be $2.00 less than the wages of
non-disabled workers. This part of the wage differential is
explained by differences in the average productivity of disabled
and non-disabled workers. The remaining $.50 wage differen-
tial is not explained by differences in the productivity-related
characteristics - strength and speed - of the two groups of
workers. This unexplained, or "residual," difference is attribut-
ed to employer discrimination against workers with disabilities.
In the example, the workers' functional limitations are
losses of strength and speed. More generally, a functional
limitation is any restriction of sensory, mental, or physical
capacities. Other examples include inability to see or hear,
inability to climb a flight of stairs or walk a short distance,
mental illness, emotional problems, or drug addiction.
Typically, studies of discrimination use regression tech-
niques to estimate the relationship between the characteristics
of minority and majority workers and their wages. Wage
equations are estimated separately for each group.' The depen-
dent variable in the equation is a measure of earnings and the
independent variables measure productivity-related characteris-
tics of workers - in our example, strength and speed. The
regression estimates of the coefficients of the independent
variables measure the wage returns to each characteristic. The
minority-majority wage differential can then be decomposed into
8 In general, the wage equations are estimated in loglinear form,
lnWi = PX . + c?. i + eiki.
where the dependent variable is the natural log of the hourly wage rate of the
ith worker, X. is a vector of variables that represent workers' productivity, and
ei is a mean-zero, random disturbance term. The variable Xi corrects for
sample selection bias, that is, the bias that results because we cannot observe
the wages that would be offered to non-workers. The sample selection correc-
tion is generated from the coefficients of a participation equation estimated for
workers and non-workers. See James J. Heckman, The Common Structure of
Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent
Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models, 5 ANNALS ECON. & SOC.
MEAsUREMENT 475 (1976).
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a part that can be explained by differences in the average
productivity-related characteristics of the two groups of workers
- measured by differences in the means of the independent
variables - and the residual - measured by differences in the
coefficients.9 In our example, eighty percent of the wage differ-
ential is explained by differences in the strength and speed of
disabled and non-disabled workers, the remaining twenty
percent residual - which arises because workers with disabili-
ties are paid only $.37 per crate moved - is attributed to
discrimination. One of the main problems with measuring
discrimination in this manner is the bias associated with omit-
ted variables.'0 If variables which measure worker produc-
tivity are excluded from the wage equations and these variables
are correlated with other variables in the equations, then the
coefficient estimates may be biased. For example, suppose that
in our warehouse example we include a variable for - "control
' Assuming that in the absence of discrimination the wage structure for
non-disabled workers would also apply to disabled workers, then the wage
differential between disabled (D) and non-disabled (ND) workers can be
decomposed as:
ln-W-; - I1nwD - (41ND - Y)= (XND - XD) PND
+ XD (OND - Ol)-
The left-hand side of the decomposition formula represents the offer wage
differential, the observed difference in log wages corrected for sample selection
bias. The first term on the right-hand side represents the part of the offer
wage differential that is explained by differences in the means of the ex-
planatory variables; the second term represents the part of the differential
that is attributed to discrimination.
Oaxaca, supra note 2, at 696-97, presents two sets of results, alterna-
tively letting the non-discriminatory wage structure be the observed wage
structure for the majority and the minority groups. Reimers, supra note 3, at
573, suggests that the non-discriminatory wage structure lies midway between
the majority and minority wage structures. More recently, several economists
suggest that the relationship between the non-discriminatory wage structure
and the observed wage structures is determined by the proportion of minority
workers in the work force. See, e.g., Cotton, supra note 3, at 238-40;
Neuinark, supra note 3, at 283-89; Marjorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson,
A Test of the Measures of Non-Discriminatory Wages Used to Study Wage
Discrimination, 59 ECON. LETrERS 223, 223-27 (1992).
" The multivariate regression method produces unbiased estimates of the
coefficients only if the error term has a zero mean and a constant variance,
with no correlation across observations. That is, E[s]=0 and E[ss']=G2I, where
I is the identity matrix. When important variables are omitted from the
regression, these assumptions are violated and the coefficient estimates may
be biased.
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for" - the strength of workers but leave out a variable for their
speed. If stronger workers also tend to work faster, then the
regression estimates of the returns to strength will be biased
upward because some of the returns to speed will be captured
by the coefficient of the strength variable. Since discrimination
is estimated by between-group differences in coefficients, the
biased coefficient estimates will produce biased estimates of
discrimination.
Omitted variables create a second problem in studies of
wage discrimination. If important variables that determine
worker productivity are omitted from the wage equations, and
if those variables are correlated with membership in the minori-
ty group, then the residual is not a valid measure of discrimina-
tion. We know, for example, that functional limitations -
restrictions to sensory, mental, or physical capacities - can
reduce productivity in some jobs, and, by definition, workers
with disabilities have more limitations than do non-disabled
workers. If measures of functional limitations are omitted from
a model of discrimination against workers with disabilities, then
wage differences associated with the productivity effects of those
limitations will appear in the residual term and be incorrectly
attributed to discrimination. In this case, the estimate of
discrimination will be too high simply because we have failed to
control for the effects of functional limitations on productivity.
III. AN APPLICATION OF THE OAXACA TECHNIQUE:
ESTIMATING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
DISABLED WORKERS
To see how omitting functional limitation variables can
change estimates of wage discrimination against workers with
disabilities, consider the following application. The data come
from a sample of 19,182 working men and women who partici-
pated in the 1984 panel of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP).n Five percent of the workers (N=1,036)
"
1 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION (SIPP) WAVE III RECTANGULAR CORE AND TOPICAL MODULE
MICRODATA FILE (1986) (Machine-Readable Datafile) [hereinafter SIPPI. The
data refer to a four month reference period between January and June 1984.
The sample is restricted to persons age 16 to .64 and excludes full-time
students, members of the armed forces, self-employed persons, and persons
who received any of the following kinds of transfer payments throughout the
reference period: social security, welfare, disability, or unemployment
1994] 283
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are disabled; that is, they respond that a health condition limits
their ability to perform basic life tasks.12 Two different esti-
mates of discrimination are computed by applying the Oaxaca
decomposition technique to two specifications of the wage
equation. These different specifications of the wage equation
are called "models."
The first model does not control for the loss of productivity
associated with functional limitations, while the second model
does. Estimates of wage discrimination from the first model are
expected to be larger than estimates from the model that in-
cludes measures of functional limitations. Explanatory vari-
ables in both models control for the effect on wages of workers'
productivity-related characteristics - corresponding to the
strength and speed variables in our earlier example - and the
demand for labor. The variables include education level, race,
union membership, experience in the current job and other jobs,
missing experience (potential labor force years not working and
not in school), and occupation. 3 The functional limitation
variables added to the second model are constructed from twelve
measures of respondents' sensory and mobility restrictions
included in the SIPP questionnaire.' 4 For the most part, the
functional limitation questions are distinct from the questions
that identify the disabled sample; thus, we obtain measures of
insurance.
12 A worker is considered disabled if he responds yes to one of the following
questions: Do you need the help of another person in order to get around?
Are you unable to do housework or prepare meals? Does a health condition
limit the kind or amount of work you can do?
13 The occupation variables identify workers in professional/managerial or
laborer occupations.
14 The twelve questions describing mobility and sensory restrictions are:
(1) Do you have any difficulty seeing words and letters in ordinary newspaper
print even when wearing glasses or contact lenses? (2) Do you have any
difficulty hearing what is said in a normal conversation with another person?
(3) Do you have any difficulty having your speech understood? (4) Do you
generally use an aid to help you get around? (5) Do you have any difficulty
lifting and carrying something as heavy as 10 pounds? (6) Do you have any
difficulty walking for a quarter of a mile? (7) Do you have any difficulty
walking up a flight of stairs? (8) Do you have any difficulty getting around
outside the house by yourself? (9) Do you have any difficulty getting around
inside the house by yourself? (10) Do you have any difficulty getting in and
out of bed by yourself? (11) Because of your health, do you need help to do
light housework? (12) Do you need help to prepare meals for yourself? SIPP,
supra note 11.
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functional limitations for both disabled and non-disabled per-
sons. The measures of functional limitations increase with
additional restrictions to the worker's mobility or sensory
capacities.
In the SIPP sample, mean hourly wages are $9.38 for non-
disabled men, $8.80 for men with disabilities, $6.56 for non-
disabled women, and $5.93 for women with disabilities. Thus,
the observed wage differentials are $.58 per hour between
disabled and non-disabled men and $.63 per hour between
disabled and non-disabled women.' 5 The observed wage differ-
entials, however, provide an incomplete picture of differences in
the labor market returns to workers with and without disabili-
ties, because important differences in the productivity-related
characteristics of the two groups are ignored.
Workers with disabilities have less education, on average,
than non-disabled workers, and are less likely to be employed in
professional or managerial occupations.' 6 The most striking
difference between the two groups, however, is in years of work
experience. The average man with a disability has eight more
years of work experience, but has more missing experience (0.5
years), than the average non-disabled man. The average wom-
an with a disability has five more years of work experience and
three more years of missing experience than the average non-
disabled woman. Differences in work experience are probably
associated with the age difference between the two groups: in
this sample, workers with disabilities are an average of nine
years older than non-disabled workers. There is little difference
in the racial distribution of the two groups or in the percent of
each group that are union members. As expected, average
values of the functional limitation variables are higher for
workers with disabilities than for non-disabled workers.
Estimates of wage discrimination from the model that does
not control for functional limitations are presented in Table
1.1' The first row reports observed wage differentials between
disabled and non-disabled workers (corresponding to the $2.50
wage gap between disabled and non-disabled warehouse work-
ers in our warehouse example). In the second row, the differen-
15 See SIPP, supra note 11.
16 The education differential is one year for disabled and non-disabled men,
and 0.8 year for disabled and non-disabled women.
17 The coefficient estimates and means on which the estimates of dis-
crimination are based are available from the author.
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tial is expressed in log form and corrected for sample selection
bias, that is, the bias that results because we cannot observe
the wages that might have been offered to non-workers. The
next section of the table reports the wage differences associated
with differences in the average characteristics of the disabled
and non-disabled groups. The sum of these components is the
explained part of the wage differential (in our warehouse exam-
ple, $2.00). The residual, attributed to discrimination, is the
wage difference associated with differences in the coefficients of
the wage equations for disabled and non-disabled workers. It
equals the difference between the offer wage differential and the
explained differential (in our warehouse example, $.50).
TABLE 1
Decomposition of Wage Differentials Between Disabled and
Non-disabled Workers: No Controls for Functional Limitation 8
Men Women
Wage Differential 0.58 0.63
Offer Wage Differential (Log) 0.064 0.037
Components of the Differential
Education 0.047 0.044
Race -0.002 -0.000
Union -0.005 -0.003
Experience -0.114 -0.031
Occupation 0.008 0.007
Explained differential -0.066 0.017
Discriminatory differential 0.130 0.019
Turning first to the results for men, the most important
factor explaining the offer wage differential between men with
disabilities and non-disabled men is the difference in their
average levels of education. Differences in work experience, on
the other hand, reduce the explained part of the wage differen-
tial. The experience component is negative because men with
disabilities have more work experience, on average, than non-
disabled men and would, therefore, be expected to earn higher
wages. The negative experience component overshadows the
other factors in the decomposition so that the explained part of
the wage differential is also negative, indicating that - control-
'8 SIPP, supra note 11.
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ling for education, experience, race, unionization, and occupation
- men with disabilities would be offered higher wages than
non-disabled men in the absence of discrimination. Thus, the
discriminatory wage differential is larger than the offer wage
differential.
To interpret the results for men, recall our warehouse
example. Suppose that, by virtue of greater experience, workers
with disabilities were able to compensate for their lack of
strength and speed and load twenty-two crates per hour, on
average. In the absence of discrimination, their wages would be
$8.80 per hour or $.40 per crate moved. If they are paid $5.50
instead, then the unexplained wage differential attributed to
discrimination ($3.30) exceeds the observed wage differential
($2.50).
The observed wage differential between women with disabil-
ities and non-disabled women is larger than the differential for
men, but the offer wage differential is smaller after controlling
for sample selection bias. Again, education is the largest posi-
tive factor contributing to the explained part of the differential,
and the experience component is negative. Overall, the vari-
ables in the model explain slightly less than half the offer wage
differential between disabled and non-disabled women; the
remaining fifty-one percent of the differential is attributed to
discrimination.
1994] 287
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TABLE 2
Decomposition of Wage Differentials Between Disabled and
Non-disabled Workers: Including Controls for Functional Limitation19
Men Women
Wage Differential 0.58 0.63
Offer Wage Differential (Log) 0.067 0.078
Components of the Differential
Functional Limitation 0.043 0.013
Education 0.047 0.044
Race -0.002 -0.000
Union -0.005 -0.003
Experience -0.115 -0.032
Occupation 0.008 0.007
Explained differential -0.024 0.029
Discriminatory differential 0.092 0.049
Table 2 presents decomposition results for the model that
includes controls for functional limitations.2° For men, the
wage model is stable; that is, the addition of functional limita-
tion variables does not change the coefficients of other variables
appreciably. The functional limitation variables are an impor-
tant factor explaining disabled/non-disabled wage differences -
including these variables in the model increases the explained
part of the wage differential. Nevertheless, the explained
differential is still negative, and there is still evidence of wage
discrimination against men with disabilities in excess of ob-
served wage differences.
The wage equation for women is also fairly stable across
specifications, with the notable exception of the sample selection
variable. When functional limitation variables are added to the
model, the coefficient of the sample selection variable changes
signs: as a result, the estimated offer wage differential doubles.
As was the case with men, differences in physical or mental
restrictions are an important factor explaining the wage differ-
ential between disabled and non-disabled women, and their
inclusion in the model increases the explained part of the wage
differential. Yet, because the estimated offer wage differential
19 SIPP, supra note 11.
20 The characteristics controlled for are those queried by the SIPP ques-
tionnaire. See supra note 14; SIPP, supra note 11.
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is twice as large as in the previous model, the variables in the
wage equation now explain only thirty-seven percent of the offer
wage differential, and the remaining sixty-three percent is
attributed to discrimination. In this case, the estimate of wage
discrimination is larger when functional limitation variables are
included in the model because the estimated offer wage differen-
tial is biased downward in the model that excludes the vari-
ables.
CONCLUSION
To enforce the employment provisions of the ADA, it is
necessary to estimate wage discrimination against workers with
disabilities using the same econometric techniques that are
applied to study discrimination against other minority groups.
In the disability context, the most difficult issue is how to
control for the effects of functional limitations on worker produc-
tivity, and whether it is appropriate to include such controls in
the equations that are used to measure wage discrimination.
The few studies that have applied a residual measure of
discrimination to workers with disabilities have included func-
tional limitation variables in the wage equation.2' Although
the variables explain part of the wage differential between
disabled and non-disabled workers, there is still a large unex-
plained residual attributed to discrimination.
The application presented in this article finds similar
results. Estimates of wage discrimination against men with
disabilities are smaller when the wage equation controls for
physical or mental restrictions, but still imply that the discrimi-
natory wage differential exceeds the observed wage differential.
The results for women are even more striking. Controlling for
physical or mental restrictions actually increases the estimate
of wage discrimination, because the model without functional
controls is mis-specified and the coefficient estimate for the
sample selection variable is biased.
The application demonstrates that persons who argue
against including functional limitation variables in the wage
equation weaken the support for findings of discrimination
against workers with disabilities. Estimates of wage discrimi-
21 Baldwin & Johnson, supra note 6; see generally Johnson & Lambrinos,
supra note 6 (discussing studies of wage discrimination between workers with
disabilities and non-disabled workers).
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nation against workers with disabilities may, in some instances,
be larger in models that include the variables.
There are other problems associated with controlling for the
effects of functional limitations on productivity that have not
been discussed here. One, it is often difficult to obtain labor
market data and data on physical or mental restrictions for the
same sample of workers. The SIPP data, for example, has no
information on workers' cognitive limitations. This variable is
omitted from the wage equations and, as discussed above, may
bias the estimates of discrimination if cognitive functions are
correlated with disability status and productivity. Two, it is not
clear how to construct summary measures of functional limita-
tions that capture all the important differences between dis-
abled and non-disabled workers and still yield models of man-
ageable size. Finally, the effects of physical or mental restric-
tions on productivity are highly correlated with job characteris-
tics and, ideally, the wage equation should control for interac-
tions between workers' limitations and job requirements.
Except for very broad measures of occupation, this has not been
accomplished.
Despite the difficulties associated with controlling for the
effects of functional limitations on worker productivity, the
evidence cited here demonstrates that economists' models of
wage discrimination can be applied to workers with disabilities.
Discriminatory wage differentials do not disappear when func-
tional controls are included in the wage equation. The better
we control for differences in productivity associated with physi-
cal or mental restrictions, the more convincing the evidence that
workers with disabilities are subject to wage discrimination and
deserve the protection of civil rights laws.
